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In a victory for free expression, the European Court has ruled that a court-imposed injunction 
banning a political activist from distributing leaflets targeting a political candidate violated 
Article 10 of the European Convention. The Court in Brosa v. Germany criticised the German 
courts for refusing to hold that the leaflet was a fair comment on a matter of public interest, 
as the threshold for proving fair comment was “disproportionately high.” 
 
The case arose when Ulrich Brosa, a 64-year-old activist, wrote a newspaper op-ed arguing 
that a local organisation, Berger 88, was an extremist right-wing organisation. The newspaper 
also published a letter from a town councillor (F.G.), who defended the organisation, arguing 
it had no extremist tendencies. The councillor was also standing in the upcoming mayoral 
elections, and Brosa decided to distribute leaflets opposing his candidacy, which read: “Don’t 
vote for an agitator. Amöneburg is the seat of several neo-Nazi organisations. Particularly 
dangerous is Berger 88, for which F.G. is providing cover.” 
 
The councillor considered the leaflets defamatory, and he successfully applied to a district 
court for a permanent injunction, restraining Brosa from further distributing the leaflets. The 
injunction was upheld on appeal, with the courts holding that the leaflets contained 
allegations of fact: (a) that the association was a particularly dangerous neo-Nazi 
organisation, and (b) F.G. was aware of this fact, but nevertheless publicly supported the 
organisation. Any violation of the injunction could result in a 250,000 euro fine, or a six-
month prison sentence.  
 
 
Brosa had argued that he was not alleging the councillor was a neo-Nazi, and claimed his 
statements constituted opinion, which were based on a number of factors, including that: (i) 
Berger “88” was written in runes font, which was a well-known neo-Nazi reference to Heil 
Hitler, with “H” being the eighth letter of the alphabet, (ii) Berger 88 members wearing their 
insignia had been present at the councillor’s election campaign, (iii) some Berger 88 
members had criminal convictions, and (iv) the German intelligence service had classified 
Berger 88 as a “fraternity” that it would “keep an eye on.” However, the German courts held 
that while these factors might not be a “mere coincidence,” and “raised a suspicion,” the 
allegations required “compelling proof,” and Brosa had failed to satisfy this standard.   
 The European Court agreed to review the injunction, and unanimously held that it violated 
Brosa’s right to freedom of expression. The Court criticised the German courts for 
categorising the leaflet’s statements as allegations of fact, “without further discussion.” First, 
on Berger 88 being a “particularly dangerous neo-Nazi organisation,” the Court held this was 
Brosa’s opinion based on his own assessment of the facts, “which might be accurate or not.” 
The opinion was “not devoid of a factual basis,” having regard to the German intelligence 
service’s continued monitoring of Berger 88 on suspicion of extremism. Moreover, use of the 
term “neo-Nazi” was not an allegation of fact, given that there are “different notions as to its 
content and significance,” especially where “particularly dangerous” precedes the term.   
 
Second, on the councillor having “covered” for Berger 88, the Court held that it “[could not] 
endorse” the German court’s view that this was an allegation of fact without a sufficient 
factual basis. The councillor’s letter to the editor arguing that Berger 88 had no right-wing 
tendencies was a “sufficient factual basis.” It followed that the standard of proof adopted by 




The Brosa judgment essentially turned on the degree of factual proof the German courts 
required in order for an opinion to constitute a fair comment. For the European Court, 
“compelling proof” was too high a threshold, and people should be allowed to express 
opinions “which might be accurate or not,” especially where they target public officials. This 
holding is consistent with the Court’s powerful rhetoric that politicians are subject to “wider 
limits of acceptable criticism,” coupled with there being “little scope” for restrictions on 
political expression under Article 10. 
 
Of note, the most striking aspect of Brosa is how there is no mention of the “right to 
reputation” under Article 8, and no mention of the “fair balance” test, where the Court must 
assess whether the German courts properly balanced the Article 8 right to reputation with the 
Article 10 right to free expression (Axel Springer v. Germany). Indeed, equally striking is 
how all the principal case law the Court relies upon in Brosa is pre-2004 (before reputation 
was recognised as a Convention right in Radio France v. France).  
 
This abandonment of Axel Springer as a template for determining defamation cases is 
consistent with recent cases from other Sections of the Court, and instead applying the old 
“most careful scrutiny” test, where reputation is “interpreted narrowly,” and “strictly 
construed” (see, e.g., Ümit Bilgiç v. Turkey, Welsh and Silva Canha v. Portugal, Jean-
Jacques Morel v. France and Soltèsz v. Slovakia). It implicitly recognises the problems 
associated with applying Article 8 to public-interest expression concerning public officials, 
and confirms that Article 8 is only triggered when statements “focus on purely personal or 
private details,” (Pipi v. Turkey) or “attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner 
causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to private life” (Karakó v. Hungary and 
Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain).   
 
Finally, and while the Brosa opinion is an excellent precedent concerning the fair comment 
defence to defamation, it may be suggested that more could have been said about the 
injunction granted. It must be remembered that (a) the injunction not only banned distribution 
of the leaflet, but also any “assertions of fact which might depict F.G as a supporter of neo-
Nazi organisations,” (b) had Brosa violated the injunction, he was subject to a possible 
250,000 euro fine, or a six-month prison sentence, and (c) the injunction applied not only 
during the election period, but was a permanent injunction.   
 
The Fifth Section in Brosa had little to say about the injunction, and this contrasts sharply 
with the Second Section’s recent judgment in Cumhuriyet Vakfi v. Turkey, which also 
concerned an injunction granted to protect a public official’s reputation. The Court in 
Cumhuriyet Vakfi took into account (a) the scope of the injunction, (b) the duration of the 
injunction, and (c) “the severity of the punishment” had the injunction been violated. 
Moreover, we can only speculate on what the Court would have held had Brosa violated the 
injunction, continued to distributed his leaflets, and been subjected to a fine or imprisonment. 
Imprisonment for defamatory speech on a matter of public interest is absolutely prohibited 
under Article 10 (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania and Belpietro v. Italy). 
 
The Brosa judgment is a striking example of the dangers associated with defamation 
injunctions, and prior restraint in general. German voters were denied the opportunity of 
being exposed to Brosa’s political expression, and his reasons for not voting for a political 
candidate. The German courts effectively censored Brosa, preventing the public from 
“learning about, and forming an opinion on, the ideas and attitudes of political leaders,” 
(Cumhuriyet Vakfi), and violated the principle in Bowman v. UK that “it is particularly 
important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are 
permitted to circulate freely.” 
